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Jurisdiction
1his ( ourt has jurisdiction oxer this Appeal pursuant to. I "tali Code Ann, §"S-2 •\-3i2m1i)
amended: and Rules 3 and 4. I 'tan Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Statement of the Issues
1. Did the Court commit an error in law by retroaeti\el\ modifying a previous Support Order ol'
the t our! that required Petitioner Kim James \)c\\ to pay child support tor the months of
June. Jul> and August of 1998.
2. Did the Court commit an error in law or abuse its discretion b\ failing to require the Petitioner
Kim James Dew to show an involuntary substantial change in circumstances before disrupting
a Court order imputing wages?
Constitutional Provisions, Statutes and Rules
Utah Code Ann. $30-3-10.6(1 ),(2)(Supp. 1997).
(1 ) hach payment or installment of child or spousal support under am child support order, is. on
and after the date it is due:
(a) a judgment with the same attributes and effect of any judgment of a district court.
except as provided in Subsection (2).
(c) not subject to retroactive modification by thisor any other jurisdiction, except as
provided in Subsection (2).
(2) A child or spousal support payment under a child support order ma\ be modified with
respect to any period during which a petition for modilieation is pending, but only from the dale
notice of that petition was given to the obligee, if the obligor is the petitioner, or to the obligor, if
the obligee is the petitioner.
I tah (ode Ann. j$78-45-7.2(7){aUh) (Supp. 1997).
(7)(a| A parent may petition the court to adjust the amount of a child support order if there has
been a substantial change in circumstances.
(7)(b) Lor purposes of Subsection (7)(a). a substantial change in circumstances ma\ include:
i) material change in custodv:
ii) material changes in the relative wealth or assets of the parties:
iii) material changes of 30'u or more in the income of a parent:
iv) material changes in the ability of a parent to earn;
v} material changes in the medical needs of the child: and
vi) material changes in the legal responsibilities ofeither parent for the support ol'
others.
Utah Code Ann. S78-45-7.S(7>(aUh) (Supp. 1997).
(7)(a) Income may not be imputed to aparent unless the parent stipulates to the amount imputed
ora hearing is held and a finding made that the parent in voluntarily underemployed or
underemployed.
(7)(b) Ifincome is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon employment potential
and probable earnings as derived from work history, occupation qualifications, and prevailing
earnings lor persons of similar backgrounds in the community.
Standards Of Review and Authority
Ihe trial court must consider the time in which the modification was pending before
determining the retroactive limitations ofasupport obligation. However. "In no event may the
[child support| award be retroactively increased beyond the period during which the modification
was pending." Ilrooks v. Brooks, 881 I\2d 955. 960 (Utah App. 1994). Io do so would be a
an
error in law. " Ihereibre. the district court is prohibited from retroactiveh appKinti its modified
order beyond the time theJrespondent ] received notice of jthe petitioner's] counter-petition."" Hall
v. Peterson. 912 P.2d 1006. 101 1 (1 tali App. 1996).
1he trial court must further consider whether a modification of support obligations is
supported by a substantia] change in circumstance and is a fresh issue not precluded under res
judicata. "In the absence of such a showing, the decree shall not be modified..."' Krambule v.
Krambule. 994 P.2d 210. 214 (Utah App. 19*)')) (citing Jacobsen. 703 P.2d at 305).
Consequently, the trial court's modification of a support order without a showing of a substantial
change in circumstances would amount to an error in law and an abuse of discretion.
Statement of the Facts
Petitioner and respondent were married in Alpine. Utah on the 2()[h da\ of July. 1978.
Iogether the parties have two minor children. Ialmadge and Steele. Decree of Divorce was
entered on September 3, 1982.
Pursuant to an Order of the Court entered on the 18'" day oi' May. 1998 (R-385 to
386). respondent was awarded sole custody and control of the minor child Steele and retained
custody and control of the minor child Talmadge. Petitioner was to pav support in the amount of
$371.00 per month beginning on the V of October. 1997. Subsequent to the above Order of the
Court, petitioner filed a Petition to Modify on or about August 31.1998 (R-3X7 to ^H).
Respondent was timely served with a Summons and copy of the above Petition to Moditv on or
about the T of September. 1998 (R-391 to 392).
On or about the 20th of May. 1999. the Honorable Gary D. Stott entered a Memorandum
Decision (R-473 to 475) wherein the Coun found that custody of the minor children Talmadge
and Steele "legally changed from the Respondent to the Petitioner on September 1. 1998,""
Ilowever. the ('ourl neglected to award the respondent child support arrearages for the months o\"
June. July and August oi~ 1998.
During the months of June, July and August of 1998. the two minor chidrcn resided with
both parlies but continued working at their personal places of employment. Uoth minor children
were employed in Mt. Pleasant. Utah. During that time, respondent resided in Mt, Pleasant. Utah.
In Ma\ ol 1999. petitioner was not working outside the home. Upon her own voluntary
decision, the petitioner remained at home and unemployed. Pursuant to the Memorandum
Decision of the court on April 25. 1997 (R-346 and 347 •'] 6). the petitioner was capable oi'
earning at least $10.00 per hour if she worked outside the home and the court imputed the same.
Statement of the Case
A. Nature of the Case
Appeal from an order entered on August 26. 1909. in the fourth District Court. I tah
County. State of Utah.
B. Course of Proceedings
The original Complain! was filed by the Plaintiff Petitioner on the 20,h dav of April 1982
(R-l to 3) and a decree was entered and signed by the District Court Judge on September 3ul.
1982 (R-16 to 21 ). Subsequent to the Decree. Plaintiil'Petitioner filed a Petition to Modify the
Decree of Divorce in September of 1996 (R-229 to 23 1) and an Amended Petition on October 4.
1996 (R-232 to 234). Trial was held on March 2. 1997 and a Memorandum Decision was entered
on April 25. 1997 (R-352). On September 19. 1997. Respondent filed a Petition to Modify (R-
360) and findings of fact and Conclusions of law and an Order Modifying the Decree of Divorce
were entered on May 19. 1998 (R-378 to 386). Then on August 31. 1998 Petitioner filed a
Petition to Modify (R-388) and thereafter Respondent filed an Answer and Counter Petition (R-
397). Trial was held on April 19, 1999 and a Memorandum Decision was entered on the 20lh of
May. 1999 <R-475). Subsequent to the Decision an Order Modifying Decree of Divorce and
Subsequent Orders was entered on August 26. 1999 (R-535).
C. Disposition
Subsequent to the Order Moditying the Decree of Divorce. Petitoner filed an Objection
and Motion for Reconsideration iR-537), In response. Respondent filed a Memorandum in
Opposition to the Motion and Order (R-574) and thereafter filed a Motion to Strike (R-576).
After denial of the petitioner's objections and consideration of respondent's motion. Notice of
Appeal was subsequently tiled by the respondent on September 27. 1999 (R-5S6). and this appeal
now follows.
Summary of the Argument
A. Pursuant to UtahCode Ann. $30-3-10.6 (Supp. 1997). Respondent Kevin James is
entitled to receive support payments from the petitioner for the months of June. July, and August
ol 1998. Utah Code Ann. $30-3-10.6(2) (Supp. 1997). provides that "A child or spousal support
pavment under a child support order may be modified with respect to any period during which a
petitionfor modification is pending but OSLYfrom the date notice of that petition was given
to the obligee..."" (Umphasis added).
The Coun found that the petitioner's support obligation terminated not in September
when the respondent received notice of the Petition to Modify, but in June, the date the court
found that the two minor children were "properly with petitioner" (R-474). Respondent claims the
two children were with him until September 1, 1998 and evidence showed both were working
through June. July and August of "98 in Mt. Pleasant. Utah where the respondent lived.
The Court failed to retroactively apply support obligations from the time the petitioner
received notice of a pending modification. Under I itah Code Ann. §30-3-10.6(2) (Supp. 1997).
modification of support obligations can be ordered only "from the date notice of that petition was
given to the obligee..." Respondent personally received nonce of the pending modification on
September 1. 1998. and petitioner filed her Petition to Mocify on August 31. 1998. Arguably, the
Order of the Court directing the petitioner to pay support should remain until notice is given to
the respondent. Any such notice was received by the respondent no earlier than August 31. 1998.
Consequently, modifications of any kind are valid under the law starting in September of 1998 and
not in June of H)8 as the Court found. Respondent should be entitled to retroactive support
arrearages in accumulation prior to the pending modification received by Respondent in
September of 1998.
B. The Petitioner has not experienced a substantial change in circumstances that warrants
the court's decision to modify a previous order imputing wages for support purposes and should
therefore be barred under res judicata. Pursuant to Utah Cods Ann. ^78-45-7.2(7)(a) (Supp.
1997). a parent may petition to adjust the amount of a child support order if there has been a
substantial change in circumstances.
Since the order imputing $10.00 per hour upon the petitioner, nothing substantial has
changed. The court found the petitioner able to work outside the home and earn at least $10.00
per hour when doing so. The court further found that the petitioner was ""voluntarilv
underemployed1" (R-346 and 347) and could obtain more work if she was so inclined.
Subsequently, the court Ibund again, in 1998. that the petitioner was capable of working outside
the home if she so chooses (R-474). Ilowever. the court imputed onh minimum wane upon the
petitioner. Since the issue of the petitioner's ability to earn income outside the home was a
circumstance that did not change from the court orders o\' 1997 through 1099. a modification of
any imputed wage is an abuse of discretion and precluded under res judicata. Summarilv. the onlv
change in circumstance was the petitioner's voluntary decision to remain underemployed or
entirely unemployed. The original court order imputing $10.00 per hour should have remained in
place.
Argument
1. THE COURT COMMITTED FKROR OF LAW BY ALLOWING MODIFICATION
BEYOND THE TIME NOTICE OF MODIFICATION WAS RFCEIYED BY THE
RESPONDENT.
A. Under Utah Code Ann. $$30-3-10.6, Respondent is Entitled to Retroactive
Support Arrearages for the Months Prior to the Filing of the Petition to Modify.
Through Order of the Court. Respondent was given custody of the minor child Ialmadge.
I pon subsequent modifications, respondent was also given custody of the minor child Steele as
well. Obligations for support were placed solely upon the petitioner and were to remain so until
there occurred a substantial change in circumstances which warranted modilieation. On or about
August 31.1998. petitioner filed a Petition to Modify and the Court eventually determined that a
substantial change occurred when the minor children allegedly began residing at the petitioner's
residence and that a modilieation of support was necessary. Under I 'tab Code Ann. vj30-V
10.6(1 )(e) (Supp. 1997), "Haeh payment or installment of child or support under any child
support order, is. on and after the date it is due...not subject to retroactive modification bv this or
any other jurisdiction, except as provided for in Subsection (2)." Simply, retroactive modification
has to. by law. meet certain criteria in order to be valid. I auh Code .Ann. $30-3-10.6(2) (Supp.
1997). stales that retroactive modification can be ordered ONLY when notice of pending
modilieation is given to the obligee. As applied to this case, notice ofanv pending modification
was served upon the respondent on September 1. 1998. fherefore. according to law. anv
contemplated modifications, whether retroactive or otherwise, must begin as of September I.
1998. Yet. this lawful modilieation did not take place.
1. Judge Stott erred by eliminating the support obligations of the petitioner
for the three months prior to the notice served upon the respondent.
Despite the apparent relevance and authority of I 'tab Code Ann. $30-3-10.6. Judge Stott
failed to order the petitioner to pay support arrearages for the 3 months immediately preceding
the filing of the Petition to Modify. This decision is clearly contrary to the confines allowed by law
and it is an unsupported deviation from case law and statutory plain meaning. Specificaliv. I ;tah
(ode Ann. ^30-3-10.6(2) (Supp. 1997). states that modifications ofanv kind are valid only to the
extent that they are traceable to an action that places the other party on notice of a change or
modification. Judge Stott. however, extended that requirement to a period of time 3 months prior
to any notice of modification tiled by the petitioner or received by the respondent.
Notwithstanding the opinion of the Court, nothing in the record suggests that the
petitioner was restricted from filing her Petition in June when she claims the minor children were
residing with her. In fact, if the petitioner was indeed subject to such a substantial change in
circumstance, she should have undoubtedly realized the need to modify anv support obligations
she was under. 1ler attorney should have realized the same. Ilowever. the tact remains that the
petitioner tiled her Petition lor Modilieation on the last day of August. 1998. This then, becomes
the critical point at which ail support modifications must begin. By modifying the support
obligations as ofJune 1. 1998. Judge Stott essentially re-wrote the law in I'tab and applied a
standard ot discretion that has neither support in the statutes nor support in the cases. As
consequence of the error, the respondent should receive arrearages for the months prior to the
tiling and service of the Petition for Modilieation.
B. Case Law is Clear that Modifications for Support Must be Applied Proactively
From the Pending Modification Action and Should Not Encompass any Periods ofTime in
Which a Party had not Received Notice of the Same.
Many cases have addressed the issue ofretroactive modifications ofsupport obligations.
The overwhelming majority ofthese cases have found that modilieation is guided explicitly bv the
statutes and that any change in obligation between the parties must necessarily look forward from
the time notice is given. In Ball v. Peterson. 912 P.2d 1006 (Utah App. 1996). this Court reversed
the district court's order to extend modifications beyond the time the respondent received notice
of the petitioner's counterpetition. "The only substantive limitation on the trial court's discretion
to retroactively modify a support award is that the modification can run "only from the date notice
of [the] petition was given' to the adverse party." kb at 1012. See also Kammersall v.
Kammersall. 792 P.2d 496. 497 n. 3 (Utah App. 1990) (stating "A child...support order may be
modified with respect to any period during which a petition for modification is pending, but only
from the date notice of that petition was given..."'); and Brooks v. Brooks. 881 P.2d 955. 960
(Utah App. 1994) (stating 'in no event may the [child supportl award be retroactively increased
beyond the period during which the modification petition was pending."). The issue in the BaH
case is for all intents and purposes indistinguishable from this case. This Court answered no in
Ball and subsequently, should answer the same now.
In support of the respondent's bid for reversal, the Supreme Court of Utah has ruled also
on the possibilities of retroactive modification. In Kills*!! V- State Department of Social Services.
716 P.2d 810 (19X6), the plaintilTclaimed that "even when a court modifies an existing support
obligation, the modification cannot be applied retroactively, but only prospectively." 'fhe Supreme
Court referred to another case in which it held "that alimony and support payments become
unalterable debts as they accrue, preventing change or modification after periodic installments
have been made." \_d. at 813 (citing Uarsen v. Uarsen, 561 P.2d 1077. 1079 (1977)). In turn the
Supreme Court ruled that "only prospective modification of a support obligation is proper." Id.
at 813 (emphasis added). According to Utah Code Ann. §30-3-10.6(2) (Supp. 1997). the only
time in which an obligation becomes prospective is when notice of a pending modification is given
to the adverse party. Here, that date was September 1. 1998. Therefore, the modification in
obligation can only be administered from that date forward, not retroactively for an extra 3
months like Judge Stott saw proper.
C. The Facts Clearly Suggest that Support Modification Beyond the Time Notice of
the Petition to Modify was Received by the Respondent is, Even in the Alternative,
Unjustified.
Despite the fact that support was modified beyond the retroactive guidelines by Judge
Stott, petitioner has failed to demonstrate circumstances that justify an alternative determination.
Petitioner filed her petition to modify at the end of August, fhe court modified support starting in
June. The reasons for this discrepancy are indeed suspicious but. as far as the law is concerned,
collateral in nature. However, this Court should at least appreciate the purposeful time frame
regarding the filing and notice of the petitioner's action. The filing of the modification in August
is, by law. dispositive of the retroactive remedies available should a modification by the court take
place. Respondent should not be held financially responsible tor choices in litigation made bv the
petitioner, fhe only thing that should be controlling in this case is the law and the facts. The
petition to modify was served upon the respondent on September 1. 1998 and the law and the
eases say any retroactive modifications may relate only to that date. Petitioner chose to tile in
August and she should be held to that date as far as any and all modifications. Therefore,
respondent is entitled to support arrearages for all time prior.
II. THE COURT MADE AN ERROR IN LAW AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
MODIFYING IMPUTED WAGES AND SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS OF THE
PETITIONER WIHTOUT A SHOWING OF AN INVOLUNTARY SUBSTANTIAL
CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES.
A. The Petitioner Has Not Experienced a Substantial Change in Circumstances that
Warrants the Court's Decision to Modify a Previous Order Imputing Wages for Support
Purposes and Should Therefore be Barred Under Res Judicata.
On April 25th. 1997 the Honorable Steven U. Hansen rendered a Memorandum Decision
imputing, for support purposes. SIO.OO per hour upon the petitioner (R-346 and 347 r16). Judge
Hansen found that the petitioner was "voluntarily underemployed" and pursuant to I jtah Code
Ann. iJ78-45-7.5(2)(b) (Supp. 1997). capable of earning a gross income of SI.720.00 per month.
Subsequently, in May of 1999. Judge Stott entered a Memorandum Decision imputing minimum
wage upon the petitioner (R-473 to 475). The decision by the court however, was without a
verification ofanv substantial change in circumstances and unwarranted as justification for
modifying the decision of Judge Hansen imputing a wage of $10.00 per hour. Seemingly, nothing
substantial had changed from April '97 to May '99. but Judge Stott nevertheless modified the
previous order of the court substantially.
Under the Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.2(7)(a) (Supp. 1997), "A parent may petition the
court to adjust the amount of a child support order if there has been a substantial change in
circumstances." Furthermore, Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.2(7)(b) (Supp. 1997), states that "a
substantial change in circumstances may include: i) material change in custody; ii) material
changes in the relative wealth or assetsof the parties; iii) material changes of 30% or more in the
income of a parent; iv) material changes in the ability of a parent to earn; v) material changes in
the medical needs of the child; and vi) material changes in the legal responsibilities of either parent
for the support of others."
As applied to the case at hand, the circumstances surrounding the petitioner should not
have risen to the substantiality required for modification under Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.2(7)(b)
(Supp. 1997). Substantively, the petitioner's financial circumstance did not change. The only thing
that changed was the petitioner's voluntary underemployment. Petitioner was imputed an earning
potential of $10.00 per hour. Yet, in the time preceding Judge Stott's decision, the petitioner
voluntarily chose to limit her employment and verified earnings. At no time between the decisions
handed down by Judge Hansen and Judge Stott did the petitioner lose the capability to earn
$10.00 per hour. In fact. Judge Stott himself stated that "it [is] fair and reasonable to impute
Petitioner an income of minimum wage due to her ability to work outside the home should she
chose to do so." (R-474 1|2). This determination was an issue already addressed by Judge Hansen
in April of'97. Through Judge Stott's own findings, the petitioner retained the potential to
achieve full employment capacity even in May of'99. Nothing substantial had changed, and
therefore, res judicata should have precluded the issue of imputed wage. See Kjrambulejv,
Krambule. 994 P.2d 210, 213 (Utah App. 1999) (stating "principles of res judicata require that a
party seeking modification of a divorce decree must demonstrate that a substantial change in
circumstance has occurred since the entry of the decree, and not contemplated in the decree
itself.")
I he decision to impute SIO.OO per hour upon the petitioner should not be disturbed when
circumstances have not changed since the issue was decided in the April "97 findings of the court.
Ihe narrow issue here involves a change in the petitioner's ability to earn so as to justitv an
adjustment in imputed wage. In 1rtah_Ci>dc Ann. §78-45-7.5(7)(a) (Supp. 1997) it reads "Income
mav not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates to the amount imputed ora hearing is
held and a finding made that the parent in voluntarilv unemployed or underemploved."
Since the court found in April of 1997 that the petitioner was "voluntarilv underemployed'
(R-346 and 347*16) and could earn SIO.OO per hour, anv change of that determination must
amount to a modilieation. And since a modification must be supported by a substantial change in
circumstances, there must be something supporting an adjustment in imputed wage. Vet. there is
nothing to suggest that here. The court in NLaughn v. Maughn. 770 P.2d 156. 160 (Utah App.
1989) stated that "The burden rests with the partv seeking modification to show a substantial
change in circumstances such as to warrant a modification." (citing Christensen v. Christensen.
628 P.2d 1297. 1299 (Utah 1981)). As evidenced bv the memorandum decision of the court in
May of 3999 all that the petitioner has proved is that she is still capable of working outside the
home or at least at her old place of employment (R-474 «'2). In fact, the petitioner has shown no
more change than what was established in the decision handed down by the court in 1997. At that
time she was working outside the home and was capable of earning $10.00 per hour. Bv 1999 she
was "able to work outside the home should she chose to do so" (R-474 c2>. In substance, nothiniz
substantial has changed in the petitioner's ability to cam a minimum SIO.OO wage. All that has
changed is the petitioner's desire to remain underemployed or entirely unemployed. It is an error
of law and an abuse of discretion then to re-evaluate an issue secmirmlv barred under res judicat;
and unsubstantialed bv the lacts.
Conclusion
Because ol the foregoing, the respondent. Kevin James, respectful!) requests that this
court reverse the determination of the lower court to retroactivclv modify support bevond the
time notice of the Petition to Modifv was given to the respondent and reinstate the previous order
requiring the petitioner to pay support through the lime preceding said Petition to Modifv.
further. Respondent respectful!) requests that this court reverse the lower court's decision to
impute minimum wage upon the petitioner and remand to the lower court with orders to comply
with the original order of (he court imputing $10.00 per hour.
Respectfully submitted this the >"» dav of *J ^ >- T .2000.
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Richard S. Nemelka
Attorney for the Respondent'Appellant
Certificate of Mailing
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KIM DEVEY JAMES
Petitioner, MEMORANDUM DECISION
vs. Case No. 824460703
KEVIN REGAN JAMES Judge Gary D. Stott
Respondent.
Before the court is a Petition to Modify filed by Kim Devey Fernstrom ("Petitioner")
Kevin James ("Respondent") fried an Answer and Counter Petition in response. The parties
appeared before the court on April 19, 1999, for a bench trail. The parties were sworn and
testified. The following issues are before the court: the date the custody of the children changed
from Respondent to Petitioner, the income of the parties, payment of past medical expenses,
payment ofback child support, Petitioner's share of the children's health insurance premium, and
payment of attorney's fees. Based upon the evidence provided at trial the court makes the
following rulings as to the issues in question:
1. Date of Custody Change - The court finds that custody of the children Talmage and
Steele legally changed from the Respondent to the Petitioner on September 1, 1998, as evidenced
by the date Petitioner filed the Petition to Modify, August 31, 1998.
2. Parties Income - The court finds that the Respondent has met his burden of proof and
established his income to be S5,105 per month, as evidenced by his W-2, 1099, and travel
expenses accounting for his employment with Ag-Bag International. The court finds that it is
appropriate to impute minimum wage to the Petitioner Petitioner testified that she had
previously worked outside the home in retail sales and food^service. Although Petitioner
currently works in the home, the court finds it fair and reasonable to impute Petitioner an income
ofminium wage due to her ability to work outside the home should she choose to do so. ^^^
However, Respondent failed to establish that Petitioner was re^eivmg^^aneratardor support
from her mother—Petitioner-is entitled-tojudgement for back child support based upon the
statutory- guidelines from September 1, 1998, to the present. The child support shall be
automatically reduced according To the statutory guidelines beginning July 1, 1999, due to one of
the children's graduation from high school.
3. Past Medical Expenses - The only evidence before the court regarding past medical
expenses are itemizations of the parties without supporting documents. Therefore, the court finds
that neither party has met their burden of proof regarding past medical expenses and the court will
not rule on this issue.
4. Past Due Child Support - Respondent is entitled to the entering of a Satisfaction of
Judgment for all child support due to Petitioner pnor to March, 1997. Respondent is also entitled
to a Judgment against Petitioner for SI,875 for her failure to pay child support for January,
February, March, April and May of 1998^_goivever, based upon the evidence presented at trial
the court finds that the cfuldpe^i were properly^ith Petitioner beginning May 30, 1999. The court
finds that Respondent consented in the transfer of custody of the children at that time and
therefore Petitioner's obligation to pay child support terminated on June 1, 1999
5. Insurance Premiums - Petitioner is ordered to pay S41.82 per month as her portion
of the insurance premium covenng her children This amount represents her one-half share of that
portion of the insurance premium which is attributable to covering her children. Under § 78-45-
7.15(4) U C.A. Petitioner's share is determined by taking the insurance premium and dividing it
by the number of dependents; multiplying that amount by the number of her children covered, and
dividing that amount by two to show her one half The total insurance premium at this time is
S250 89, the number of dependants six and the number of her children covered is two. Petitioner
has failed to establish that she had insurance from June 1995 until Respondent was ordered to
cover the children in of May 1997. Therefore, Respondent is entitled to a judgment for past
insurance contributions from June 1995 until the present However, the court has found in error
in Respondent's calculations for January 1998. Petitioner's share for January should be adjusted
to 533.16.
6. Attorney's Fees - Each party in responsible for th; payment of their own attorney's
fees.
Counsel for Respondent shall prepare an order consistent with this Ruling and submit it to
Petitioner and the Court for signature within twenty (20) days of the date of this Ruling.
DATED this P^ dav of flfltUi , I999.
BY THE COURT
GARY D STOTT, fttbc^gvj J£|9
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KIM DEVEY,
Plaintiff.
vs.
KEVIN REGAN JAMES,
Defendant.
CASE NO. 824460703
DATE: April 25, 1997
MEMORANDUM DECISION
JUDGE STEVEN L. HANSEN
The above entitled matter came regularly on Plaintiffs Amended Order to Show
Cause, defendant's Motion for Temporary Relief, plaintiffs Second Amended Verified
Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce and defendant's Answer thereto. The case was tried
March 2, 1997. Plaintiffwas present and represented by her counsel, Michelle Wilson.
Defendant was also present and represented by Richard S. Nemelka. The parties and
witnesses were sworn and testimonial and physical evidence was received. The court hereby
enters its findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Findings of Fact
1. A Decree of Divorce was entered in the above-entitled matter on
approximately the 3rd day of September, 1982 wherein the plaintiff was awarded the sole
custody of all three of the parties' minor children. Subsequent to the entry of the Divorce
Decree and by Order of the Court, on or about the 28th day of August, 3992, the defendant
was awarded the custody of the minor child. Talmage, and the plaintiff retained custody of
the minor children, Tyler and Steele.
2. An Order, pursuant to Stipulation, was entered by the Court on July 6, 1995
wherein the defendant was ordered to pay to the plaintiff child support in the sum of $393.92
commencing in March 1995. Said Order also ordered the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the
sum of $750.00 for the period commencing June 1, 1995 through October 1, 1995 and the
sum of $584.00 on November 1, 1995 which would have paid all child support arrearages
owed to the plaintiff Defendant's ongoing monthly child support obligation would then be
S393.92 commencing on December 1, 1995.
3. The court finds that the Order entered in July of 1995 contemplated an
increase in Defendant's income and ordered that on September 1995 and again in March
1996, the Defendant and Plaintiffs incomes would be re-evaluated to calculate child support,
which would be "automatically" adjusted.
4. The court finds that the automatic adjustments did not occur as ordered and the
further finds that it is equitable to make those adjustments retroactively.
5. Paragraph 7 of the July 1995 Order ordered both parties to obtain and maintain
medical and dental insurance on the minor children ifavailable through their employment at
a reasonable cost and that the parties would equally divide all non-covered medical and
dental expenses. Defendant had and does have insurance through his employment, but
plaintiff never has had insurance through her employment. Further, paragraph 8 of said
Order allowed the defendant to subtract plaintiffs one-half (1/2) share of the insurance
premium in the amount of $44.36 from the payment of monthly child support obligation to
the plaintiff.
6. On or about September 1995, the defendant, through his attorney and pursuant
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to paragraph 4 of the July 1995 Order, provided to plaintiffs counsel information in regard
to defendant's income and requested information in regard to plaintiffs gross income. In
December 1995, plaintiffs counsel responded to defendant's request but the parties were
unable to agree upon the gross income of each of the parties. Further on December 28,
1995, defendant's counsel provided to plaintiffs counsel an insurance memorandum
indicating that defendant's premium for the medical coverage for the minor children had
increased to $232.15 per month. Defendant, on approximately December 25, 1995 also
requested that plaintiff provide to defendant the name of her bank and account number so
that defendant could set up the court ordered automatic transfer. From December 1995
through July of 1996, defendant's counsel made additional requests for financial information
from the plaintiffbut the same was not provided.
7. Talmage moved to his mother's house the first week in July of 1996. Based
on this move, Plaintiff filed a Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce, in September of
1996, seeking custody of Talmage. Subsequent to the filing of the Petition to Modify,
Plaintiff filed an Order to Show Cause seeking temporary custody ofTalmage and temporary
child support for Talmage. On October 4, 1996, Plaintiff filed an Amended Petition to
Modify and an Amended Order to Show Cause.
8. Talmage moved back to his father's home in late December. This move was
followed by Tyler's move from his mother's home to his father's home in February. Based
on these moves, Defendant filed a Motion for Temporary Relief, on February 10, 1997,
seeking a modification of child support, and enforcement of the July 1995 order. Finally, on
February 26, 1997, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Petition to Modify seeking a change in
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custody and adjustment in child support, based on the fact that Tyler and Talmage now lived
with their father. On that same day, Defendant filed an Answer to the Petition to Modify
and an Amended Answer to the Petition.
Child Support Arrearages
9. In Plaintiffs Order to Show Cause, filed November 22, 1996, Plaintiff
maintains that Defendant failed to pay child support for the months of July, August,
September and October of 1996.
10. From March 1995 through December 1996, the defendant paid to the plaintiff
most of the ongoing child support, and the payments toward the arrearages as ordered by the
July 1995 Order. During said period, the defendant deducted from his child support the
obligation of the plaintiff for the medical insurance premium for the minor children,
plaintiffs one-half (1/2) of medical costs incurred. Defendant claims that because he is the
noncustodial parent and his children visited him during June and July of 1996, he is entilted
to deduct one-half of his child support. Defendant's Exhibit 6 offered into evidence reflects
the payments made by the defendant to the plaintiff.
11. The court finds, however, that the defendant has not paid in full all obligations
ordered under the July 1995 Order. Defendant was obligated to pay $300.00 and $200.00
stated in paragraph 6 of said Order for back attorney's fees. Defendant's and plaintiffs
testimony directly conflicted on the intent of the order. The court, however, interprets the
lanuguage of the July order to read that the defendant's obligation, to pay these monies, was
in addition to the $750.00 payments made. The court, therefore, finds that these amounts
were not included in the $750.00 payments, paid from June 1995 through October 1995, and
the $584.00 payment paid in November 1995. This $500.00 amount, previously ordered,
shall be offset against the overall arrearage set forth below.
12. Defendant also deducted S230.35 in June and $115.18 in July, under the
auspices of Utah Code §78-45-7.11, which allows child support to be reduced by 50%
during periods when the child is with the noncustodial parent for 25 of 30 days. The
deduction, however, can only be made puruant to coun order, or by written stipulation of the
parties. The court has no evidence of a court order or written stipulation which would allow
Defendant to make such deductions. Therefore, Defendant is obligated to pay to Plaintiff the
sum of 5345.53, which represents the total of $230.35 and $115.18.
September 1995 through February 1996
13. September of 1995, was the first date, in the July order, that the Court ordered
a review and automatic adjustment of the child support. Plaintiff's order to show cause,
dated November 22, 1996, requests that Defendant be held in contempt for not making the
automatic adjustment. Additionally, Defendant's Motion for Temporary Relief requests that
Plaintiff be held in contempt for not providing the necessary financial information to make
the automatic adjustment.
14. Prior to September of 1995, the defendant was an independent sales
representative for AG-BAG International and was paid a sales salary and commission.
Defendant also had an additional business known as Western Ameri-Care which his wife,
Stacey James, managed. Plaintiff was employed part-time as a server at TGI-Fridays as well
as having her part-time business selling nutritional supplements.
15. Plaintiff maintains a checking account at The Bank of American Fork and for
six months prior to September plaintiff deposited in said bank account the sum of $23,662.21
or an average monthly deposit of $3,943.87, as more specifically stated on defendant's
Exhibit 3. Included in said deposits, were monthly child support payments made by the
defendant, in the amount of $440.00, as well as some of the child support payments paid by
plaintiffs second husband. Plaintiff also testified that deposits were made which were monies
taken against a credit card. Furthermore, Plaintiff testified that she deposited in her account
monies she received from her nutritional supplements business. Defendant's position is that
the total amount of gross receipts or sales for this business for the year 1995 was $6,300.00
or a monthly average of $525.00. Plaintiff testified that part of these gross receipts,
however, represent gross receipts from other business associates of the Plaintiff. Plaintiff
further testified that she has used the bank account to pass money, earmarked for the
reconstruction of her home. The court finds that much of the reconstruction money was
derived from the capital gains resulting from the 1995 sale of real property, therefore, it
would not be appropriate for the court to double count these amounts, in calculating
Plaintiffs gross income. In the end, the court is persuaded that Plaintiffs bank records do
not adequately reflect Plaintiffs true income.
16. Plaintiff currently works for TGI Friday's as a server. She testified that she
receives eight to ten dollars an hour in regular hourly wages and tips. Cary Nemelka
testified that servers at TGI-Fridays make between $10.00 to $15.00 per hour and that the
plaintiff had the opportunity to work full-time or forty hours a week. Plaintiff, however,
testified that she works morning shifts, and therefore, does not earn the amount of tips that
an ordinary server would make. The court, however, finds that Plaintiff is voluntarily
underemployed, as she testified that it is her choice to not work full time at TGI Friday's.
Taking the common grounds between the Plaintiff and Mr. Cary Nemelka, the court finds
that Plaintiff can make $10.00 per hour. The court will impute a full time work schedule to
Plaintiff at this wage, pursuant to Utah Code § 78-45-7.5(2)(b) which results in a gross
income from TGI-Friday's of $1,720.00 (SIO.OO x 40 hrs. x 4.3 months).
17. In addition to her job at TGI Friday's, she also makes approximately $50.00
per month in her nutritional company.
18. In July of 1995, Plaintiff realized a capital gain of $19,420.00, which
according to Utah Code §78-45-7.5 represents income. This amount, and $478.00 in interest
on this amount, are stated in plaintiffs 1995 income tax return entered into evidence as
plaintiff's Exhibit 4. Plaintiff specifically testified that she owned a piece of property which
was sold in approximately August of 1995 for the sum of $48,000.00 of which she realized
the sum of $45,000.00 which included not only the capital gain of $19,420.00 but the
approximate sum of $25,580.00 which was the cost of said property. Therefore, the court
finds that for a twelve month period, Plaintiff enjoyed a monthly income of $1,658.17
(($19,420.00 + $478.00) - 12).
19. Regarding the capital gain mentioned above, the court did not consider
$25,000.00 of the $45,000.00 as income to the Plaintiff. The evidence supported that much
of this money was a gift or inheritance received by Plaintiff from her father's estate. What
was not established, however, was that this money was received during periods relevant to
setting the September child support amount. Therefore, the court declines to consider the
$25,000.00 sum part of Plaintiffs gross income.
20. Plaintiff resides in a home located at 38 South 200 East in Alpine, Utah, of
approximately 900 square feet. Plaintiff added on to said home the approximate amount of
1,400 square feet. The home is owned by plaintiffs mother, Lorna Larsen, and there is a
verbal agreement to sell the home to the plaintiff. Plaintiff, however, has not paid anything
toward the home purchase as of the date of the trial. Plaintiff testified that the fair rental
value of the home would be approximately $400.00 per month; however, plaintiffs mother,
Lorna Larsen, testified that she rents a home of approximately 800 square feet in Alpine,
Utah for $750.00 per month. Defendant testified that he believes the fair market rental value
of the home is $1,000.00 per month. Both plaintiff and her mother, Lorna Larsen, testified
that plaintiff has never paid any rent for the home in which she resided during the time
periods in which the parties have asked the Court to recalculate child support. Both plaintiff
and plaintiffs mother, Lorna Larsen, also testified that plaintiff has not paid any amounts
toward the purchase of the home, and that as of yet no sales contract exists. The court finds
that comparable estimate on the 800 square foot home, the best evidence of fair market rental
value of the home in which Plaintiff lives. Therefore, the court finds that plaintiff receives a
$750.00 benefit and gift from her mother on a monthly basis. This gift will be considered as
part of plaintiffs gross income.
21. Plaintiffs average historical income, for the six months prior to the September
review date, is $4,188.00 which includes the $1,658.00 per month from the $19,420.00
capital gain, $750.00 per month rental value for her mother's home, $1,720.00 from her TGI
Friday's job, and $50.00 from the profits she makes on her nutritional company.
22. The court finds that Defendant's average monthly income for the six month
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period directly before September of 1995 is $2,898.66 based on defendant's exhibits seven
and eight. As shown by Defendant's pay stub, the court finds that the $1,500.00 travel
stipend, which is given to the defendant, constitutes business expenses, as defendant testified
that he uses more than the $1,500.00 amount for his travel expenses associated with his job.
Therefore, the court will not include the $1,500.00 for purposes of calculating defendant's
gross income.
23. Based on the split custody worksheet, Defendant is ordered to pay $115.00 in
child support to Plaintiff. See, Appendix A.
24. For the first automatic review period from September of 1995 through
February of 1996, Defendant's total child support obligation was $690.00 ($115.00 x 6).
During this same period Defendant made monthly child support payments of $393.92.
resulting in a total child support amount of $2,363.52. Therefore, for the period of
September, 1995 through February. 1996, Defendant overpaid Plaintiff $1,673.52.
25. The court finds that there is insufficient evidence presented by either party that
the opposing party willfully disobeyed the orders of the court.
March 1996 through the Date of Trial
26. March of 1996, was the second date that the Court ordered a review and
automatic adjustment of the child support. Plaintiffs order to show cause, dated November
22, 1996, requests that Defendant be held in contempt for not making the automatic
adjustment. Additionally, Defendant's Motion for Temporary Relief requests that Plaintiff be
held in contempt for not providing the necessary financial information to make the automatic
adjustment.
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27. Prior to March of 1996, the defendant was an independent sales representative
for AG-BAG International and was paid a sales salary and commission. Defendant also had
an additional business known as Western Ameri-Care which his wife, Stacey James,
managed. Plaintiff was employed part-time as a server at TGLFridays as well as having her
part-time business selling nutritional supplements.
28. The court finds that Plaintiff's income did not change for purposes of
calculating her income for child support for the period from March of 1996 to July of 1996.
Therefore, Plaintiff earned an average monthly income of $4,138.00 which includes the
$1,618.00 per month from the $45,000.00 sale of property, $750.00 per month rental value
for her mother's home and residence, $1,720.00 from her TGI Friday's job, and $50.00
from the profits she makes on her nutritional company.
29. Again, the court has decided not to follow Defendant's analysis of the
Plaintiffs bank account, as it is apparent to the court that the amounts included in Plaintiffs
bank account do not reflect Plaintiffs income. Plaintiff has used this bank account as a
general business account for her nutritional company, and some of the amounts reflected in
the account represent the gross receipts, including business expenses, of the Nutritional
company. Furthermore, Plaintiff testified that she has used this general bank account to
pass money, earmarked for the reconstruction of her home. The court finds that much of
this money was derived from the capital gains resulting from the 1995 sale of real property,
therefore, it would be inappropriate for the court to double count these amounts, in
calculating Plaintiffs gross income.
30. The court finds that Defendant's average monthly income for the six month
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period, directly before March 1996, is $3,918.66 based on defendant's exhibits seven and
eight. The court finds that the $1,500.00 travel stipend, which is given to the defendant,
constitutes business expenses, as defendant testified and his pay stubs support that he uses the
$1,500.00 amount for his travel expenses associated with his job. Therefore, the court will
not include the $1,500.00 for purposes ofcalculating defendant's gross income.
31. Based on the respective incomes, the Defendant is obligated to pay $243.00, as
child support, for this period. See, Appendix B.
32. During this five month period, Defendant's total child support obligation was
$1,215.00 ($243.00 x 5). Defendant paid $393.92 each month, resulting in Defendant
having paid $1,969.60. Thus, Defendant overpaid Plaintiff $754.60 during this period.
33. As of August 1996, the $1,618.00 that Plaintiff enjoyed from the amortization
of the $19,420.00 capital gain was not available to Plaintiff since this income should only be
considered as pan of her gross income for one year and she received this money in August
of 1995. Because the income from the capital gain is not part of her income hereafter,
Plaintiffs gross income dropped from $4,138.00 to $2,520.00 beginning in September of
1996. This $2,520.00 figure represents the regular and imputed income for Plaintiffsjob at
TGI Fnday's, the rental gift that she receives monthly from her mother, and the small
income she receives from her nutritional company.
34. Defendant's gross income, for this period, remains at $3,918.66.
35. Because of Plaintiffs reduced income, Defendant's child support obligation
rose to $405.00 beginning September 1, 1996. See, Appendix C.
36. Despite the fact that Talmage moved to his mother's home for six months, and
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the fact that Tyler moved to his father's home in February of 1997, neither Plaintiff nor
Defendant is entitled to reduce, by half, his or her amount of child support obligation. Utah
Code § 78-45-7.11 requires a court order or signed stipulation by the parties, in order to
reduce, by half, the amount of child support, neither of which in present in this case.
37. From September of 1996 to the date of trial, a six month period, Defendant
was obligated to pay to Plaintiffa total of $2,430.00 ($405.00 x 6). Defendant made
monthly payments in the amount of $427.81 during this period, resulting in total payments of
$2,566.86. Therefore, Defendant overpaid Plaintiff$136.86.
Retroactivity
38. The court notes the court's findings in paragraph 7 and 8 regarding the
movements of the parties' children. The court finds that both parties have filed Petitions to
Modify and Orders to Show Cause. The court has made its decision regarding the
automatic adjustments, for periods begining September of 1995 and March of 1996, based on
the July 1995 order. That order anticipated the automatic adjustments, and as such, the court
has retroactively set child support for these periods. The court, however, is not inclined to
retroactively apply its decision regarding future child support payments. This is primarily
because, with the exception of the final petition to modify filed very close to trial, the
petitions and orders to show cause do not request the ultimate relief that was granted. All of
these pleadings, filed with the court, anticipated that Talmage and Tyler would live with their
mother. The stipulation of the parties is that custody of Talmage and Tyler be awarded to
Defendant. It would be inconsistent with the purpose of making an order retroactive, when
the prior pleadings of the parties did not seek the remedies set forth by this court today.
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Therefore, the court declines to apply the child support awards retroactive to the date of any
of the Petitions to Modify or Orders to Show Cause.
Date of Trial - Forward
39. The court finds that a substantial change in circumstances has occuned in that
Tyler and Talmage now live with their father, and there was a substantial increase in the
father's income since the last order of March of 1996. These changes necessitate modifying
the existing custody order, and the existing child support order.
40. Based on the stipulation of the parties, custody of Tyler and Talmage shall be
with their father. Custody of Steele shall remain with their mother. This custody
arrangement is based on the stipulation of the parties.
41. Plaintiffs gross income remains the same as the last period at $2,520.00.
42. Since July of 1996, Plaintiffs income has dropped, as her income from the
capital gains was no longer available to her. At the same time. Defendant's income has
nsen, resulting in a substantial change in circumstances. The court finds that evidence from
July 1996 to December of 1996. a six month penod, best illustrates the parties ongoing gross
income. Defendant's average gross income during this period is $5,617.00, based on
Defendant's Exhibit 8.
43. Based on the parties' respective cunent gross incomes, and the stipulation that
Tyler and Talmagc's custody be with their father, the court finds that Defendant is required
to pay $37.00 in child support each month, as represented by the split custodv worksheet.
This results in greater than a 25% change from the previous order of $405.00. See,
Appendix D.
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44. The court finds that Tyler is 18 and about to graduate from high school.
Therefore, child support shall be recalculated starting in June of 1997. Therefore, starting in
June of 1997, Defendant's monthly child support obligation will increase to $238.00 per
month. See, Appendix E.
Attorney's Fees
45. In considering whether to grant attorney's fees the court considers the
following: The difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the
case, the reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case, the fee customarily
charged in the locality for similar services, the amount involved in the case and the result
attained, and the expertise and experience of the attorneys involved. Barton v. Tsem. 296
Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 30 (Utah 1996). The court can also consider the parties ability to pay
thc fees. Savage v. Savape. 658 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah 1983).
46. Both parties have incurred attorney's fees in defending and prosecuting this
matter. The court finds that both attorney's acted with efficiency in presenting their cases.
The court, however, finds that neither party substantially orevailed in their cases, and that
both parties have the ability to pay for their attorney's fees. Therefore, each party shall bear
the cost of their own attorney's fees.
Contempt
47. Neither party is in contempt of any Orders of the Court. In order to support a
finding of contempt, it must be shown that the party knew of a court order and willfully
disobeyed the order of the court. The court finds, insufficient evidence to support a finding
that either party had the requisite intent to disobey the orders of this court.
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Insurance
48. The current court order requires that both parties maintain health insurance,
and that both parties should cover all uncovered medical and dental costs. It further
provided that the party which did not incur the initial cost would reimburse the other within
fifteen days of receipt of the cost.
49. Plaintiff has taken the position that she should be obligated to retain insurance
for the minor children, as she can acquire insurance at a better rate than Defendant. Plaintiff
also takes the position that Defendant should pay to Plaintiff one-half of the insurance
premiums and that each party should equally divide one-half of all out-of pocket medical,
dental and orthodontic costs for the benefit of the minor children.
50. Plaintiff testified that she can obtain insurance with a $62.00 per month
premium, a $50 deductible, with 90% coverage, and $10-15 co-payments. Defendant
testified that his insurance requires a $500.00 per person deductible, and his premium is
$232.15 per month.
51. Based on the above facts, the court finds that Plaintiffs insurance policy is
better for the interests of the minor children. Defendant will be obligated to pay one-half of
the monthly premium for the minor children's portion of the insurance, pursuant to Utah
Code § 78-45-7.15.
52. Both parties are to bear the burden of one-half of the out-of-pocket medical
and dental expenses. Both parties are to submit proof of payment, within thirty days of
incurring the cost. Pursuant to the previous order, the party that did not incur the expense
will then have fifteen days to make payment to the cost incuiring parent.
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53. While not obligated, Defendant is free to provide secondary insurance for the
minor children to help cover his one-half of the out-of-pocket expenses. Plaintiff, however,
will not be required to pay any amount toward the premijm or deductibles for this policy.
Automatic Withholding
54. The July 1995 order contained a provision which stated that if Defendant failed
to pay his child support timely, his income would become subject to "immediate and
automatic withholding pursuant to Utah Code Annotated $62A-11-501 through 504 and §78-
45-9."
55. It is plaintiffs position that child support should be collected by the Office of
Recovery Service. Plaintiff testified that the child support payments were always late, that
Defendant has always been self-employed which has made it hard to collect the child support
from him, and she cannot afford the legal fees if she had to collect future child support
amounts.
56. It is defendant's position that he has been ciligent in paying his support and
that automatic withholding is not necessary.
57. The court finds that it would be beneficial to the parties, and in the best
interest of the children, if the support payments were paid directly to the Office of Recovery
Services.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. A substantial and material change of circumstances has occurred justifying a
modification of the Decree of Divorce and subsequent Orders entered in the above-entilted
matter.
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2. Ongoing child support for the parties' minor children requires Defendant to
pay $37.00 in child support each month. This child support calculation shall be effective as
of the date of trial. See, Appendix D.
3. As Tyler is about to graduate from high school, child support shall be
recalculated starting in June of 1997. Accordingly, Defendant's child support obligation will
increase to $238.00 per month at that time. See, Appendix E.
4. Judgment in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff shall be entered in the
amount of$1,380.03. This is based on the following calculation:
Arrearage from paragraph six ofJune 1995 order ($500.00)
Child support arrearage from June and July of 1995 ($345.53)
Child support surplus from 9/95 to 3/96 $1,673.52
Child support surplus from 3/96- to 7/96 $754.00
Child support arrearage from 8/96 to date of trial $136.86
Total $1,718.85
5. It is now the order of the court, pursuant to Utah Code §78-45-7.11, that a
non-custodial parent's monthly child support obligation can be reduced by 50%, if a child
stays with the non-custodial parent for 25 of 30 consecutive days.
6. Plaintiff will maintain the insurance on the minor children. Both parties shall
pay one-half of the insurance premium associated with the minor children, and one-half of all
other out-of-pocket medical and dental expenses. Notification of the cost, by the parent
incurring the cost, shall occur not later than thirty days after the cost is incurred. Payment
on the cost shall occur not later than fifteen days after notification of the cost.
7. Neither party is in contempt of court, as the requisite intent is not present.
8. Child support payments shall be automatically withheld, and sent to the Office
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of Recovery Services. Defendant shall pay the seven dollar co-payment associated with this
service.
DATED this day ^i^of Mafch, 1997.
cc: Michelle Wilson
Richard Nemelka
BY THE COUR^jJg^S^^^^f.
